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438 Abstract
This exploratory study takes a new look at the tax systems of countries in the 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). We measure a 
country’s tax system using time-series cross-sectional data on tax collection vari-
ables as well as a cross-sectional metric assessing tax administration and enforce-
ment. More specifically, we examine the countries’ (i) overall tax burden, (ii) income 
tax reliance, and (iii) fiscal decentralization as well as some “non-rate” variables 
related to tax administration and enforcement. The purpose is to compare Euro-
pean Union (EU) member states and those countries in the eurozone with other 
OECD countries and over time in order to test (1) whether EU member states and 
eurozone countries have tax systems that are more similar to each other than to 
other countries, and (2) whether some tax harmonization is taking place – within 
the EU (eurozone) and other countries. The descriptive analysis and graphical 
representation, as well as first empirical tests, show that the tax systems of EU 
member states and eurozone countries are significantly different from other coun-
tries’ tax systems. Yet, we do not find much tax harmonization in the EU (eurozone) 
countries over time. Future research might delve more into the question what drives 
harmonization with the intention of eventually formulating policy strategies. 
Keywords: tax harmonization, tax burden, European Union, eurozone, fiscal 
decentralization, tax systems
1 INTRODUCTION
Tax policy management and harmonization have always been a topic of concern 
for the European Union and its member countries. The European debt crisis rein-
vigorated efforts within the EU to coordinate tax policies across the different 
member nations. Accordingly, the purpose of this research is to take a new look at 
the effects of past tax policy coordination in Europe. More specifically, we exam-
ine countries within the EU and countries that have joined the common currency 
system (the eurozone) and are evaluating whether these tax systems are more 
similar, or are becoming more similar, to each other than they are to the tax struc-
tures of other countries. In our analysis we use several dimensions that measure 
the overall tax burden, the importance of different types of taxes within the tax 
system, the decentralization of tax collection, the tax administration and enforce-
ment. We focus on tax collection (in relationship to other economic measures) as 
well as administration and enforcement because in our opinion although both fac-
tors are important in the evaluation of a country’s tax policy, academic research, 
especially in the economics literature, has been less focused on these particular 
aspects of tax systems. In the second part of the study, we attempt to isolate factors 
that impact tax system similarities and differences as well as tax system harmoni-
zation within the EU and in eurozone member countries, with the ultimate inten-
tion to formulate a number of tax policy strategies.
We base our analysis on the concept of fiscal competition, which suggests that 
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439ries concerning the notion that (national) political culture affects “national styles 
of taxation”. The tax competition theory suggests that countries will try to lower 
their effective tax rate below those of other countries in order to attract taxpayers, 
which speaks against the synchronization of different tax systems.1 This anti-har-
monization effect will be stronger for certain taxes than others and for certain 
countries than others, due to the relative mobility of the tax base. For example, it 
is easier for corporations to move their headquarters from one country to another 
than for individuals to leave their home country. Further, moving within the EU is 
generally easier than from EU to non-EU countries and vice-versa. Thus, we ex-
pect to see the effects of tax competition more for corporate income tax (and 
within the EU) and much less for real estate property taxes (and outside the EU). 
On the other hand, culture has been shown to impact accounting and tax systems, 
which would indicate that as countries’ cultures change and move towards an un-
derstanding of global citizenship, tax systems will become more similar to each 
other as well. This concept also suggests that countries with similar histories and 
therefore similar cultures will have similar tax systems. 
We gather the information for each country’s tax system from the Organisation of 
Economic Co-operation and Development database. In the first part of the study, 
we compare the following tax system dimensions across the different countries and 
decades: tax burden (years 1965-2012), income tax reliance (years 1965-2012), and 
fiscal decentralization (years 1973-2012). For the tax administration and enforce-
ment metrics only cross-sectional – no time-series – data are available. In addition 
to using descriptive metrics, such as correlation analysis, we also visualize which 
countries’ systems are closest to each other.
In the second part of the study, we employ regression analysis to determine which 
factors affect the harmonization of tax systems within the EU and the eurozone 
compared to other OECD countries. We develop a harmonization metric by using 
the scaled absolute difference to the mean (of each tax system measure) as depend-
ent variable and five-year increments as independent variables. The EU and euro-
zone membership for each country and year is measured using indicator variables. 
Interactions between EU and eurozone membership and the time variables measure 
whether harmonization is significantly different within the EU and the eurozone. 
Additional factors potentially impacting harmonization, such as common versus 
code law legal system, country size as well as economic and demographic controls, 
are also included as the regression model’s explanatory variables. 
Our study contributes to the current literature by taking a new look at how tax 
systems compare within the EU and with other non-EU countries’ systems. We 
focus on tax collection variables, which allows us to examine a long time period 
1 Although tax competition theory focuses on tax policy (i.e., the political process of setting tax base and tax 
rates), the end goal of these strategies is to maximize government revenues, which is the product of total tax 
base x average tax rate for each individual tax. Thus, our variables are revenue-oriented and do not include 
more direct tax policy measures such as marginal or average tax rates and/or tax base. Additionally, the use of 
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440 and a relatively large dataset of different countries. However, we also take a look 
at a cross-sectional dataset of tax administration/enforcement metrics. We further 
examine a list of potential factors affecting the harmonization of tax policies within 
and outside the EU and include non-rate factors in our analysis.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the next section provides 
background – including some literature review – and our research question. Sec-
tion three describes the methodology and the data used for the study. Section four 
presents our results and section five concludes.
2 BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Tax systems have been compared across and within countries by looking at tax 
burdens and tax mix across time and countries, the impact of culture on the devel-
opment of tax systems as well as non-rate factors (e.g., Robinson and Slemrod, 
2011; Richardson, 2007; Bach, Seidel and Teichmann, 2002). Researchers have 
found that tax systems vary significantly, that there is some indication of national 
culture affecting the development of different tax structures (Pippin et al., 2010), 
and that non-rate factors of tax systems, i.e. factors related to procedure and en-
forcement, can also have a significant economic impact (Robinson and Slemrod, 
2011). Similarly, studies examining the conflicting effects of tax harmonization 
efforts versus tax competition are plentiful (e.g., Lamaanen, Simula and Torstila, 
2012; Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano, 2008; Florin, 2010; Gravelle, 1986). 
Culture has also been found to be one of the explanatory factors in the develop-
ment of national accounting systems (Roberts and Salter, 1999), as well as in the 
adoption of international accounting standards (IFRS) (Lasmin, 2012). The recent 
debt crisis in Europe has reinvigorated efforts within the EU to coordinate tax 
policies across the different member nations (e.g., van der Made, 2011; Tofan, 
2011; Matei and Pirvu, 2010); one example of this is the proposal of the Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base. 
As stated above, the purpose of the study is to first analyze and demonstrate how 
(and which) countries’ tax systems differ from each other. We select three tax-rate 
factors, each measuring a different aspect of tax collection/government revenues, 
to examine these differences and similarities. In addition, we also compare non-
rate factors (Robinson and Slemrod, 2011). The three tax rate factors measure 
overall tax burden, income tax reliance, and fiscal decentralization. Overall tax 
burden is the primary indicator of most tax system comparisons. It is measured as 
tax revenues as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). While experts 
disagree on the progressivity of other taxes, such as levies on consumption and 
property, income taxes are generally designed to be progressive (Richardson, 
2007; Robinson and Slemrod, 2011). Thus, for the tax system’s second factor we 
focus on each country’s reliance on income taxes to generate revenues as a proxy 
for progressivity. The variable is determined by dividing the tax revenues from 
income taxes into total tax revenues. The third tax rate variable focuses on the 
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441the principle of subsidiarity believe that economic, political, and social issues 
should be dealt with at the most immediate level consistent with their resolution. 
According to this principle it is advantageous to handle taxes (and spending) at the 
local (or state) level because local authorities are more familiar with the commu-
nity’s needs, governments are more likely to be held accountable, and taxpayers 
are more likely to report and submit their taxes because of the reduced anonymity 
(e.g., Chu and Yang, 2012; Buser, 2011). However, as with the economies of scale 
argument, a central tax administration may have the advantage of reducing costs 
by handling a large volume of tax filings under one roof. That is, a centralized 
system, where decisions presumably are made by experts, may have the benefit of 
fewer errors in judgment and lower overall cost of collection. Additionally, it 
might be a means to reduce tax competition at the sub-national level. Historically, 
nations have adopted different strategies with some being more and some less 
centralized with regard to political decision making and government responsibili-
ties. We expect that the level of government responsible for tax collection will 
vary depending on a country’s historical, political, and cultural background.2 Fis-
cal decentralization or centralization (with regard to the level of tax collection) is 
therefore another key characteristic of any tax system. Using these three tax sys-
tem variables, tax burden, income tax reliance, and fiscal decentralization, we 
examine fiscal differences, similarities, and harmonization within and outside the 
EU. In addition to that, we also compare these “rate variables” with the non-rate 
tax system metrics described in the Robinson and Slemrod (2011) paper.3 
Our research questions can therefore be summarized as follows: 
1) Are taxes/tax systems within the EU and within the eurozone significantly 
different from other taxes/tax systems? 
2) In what dimensions are tax systems within the EU and within the eurozone 
most similar?
3) Are countries within the EU and within the eurozone coordinating their tax 
systems over time? and
4) Is there a stronger tax system coordination within the EU and within the 
eurozone than in other countries?
Tax harmonization and coordination have been subject to various debates within 
the EU since the 1970s. The two main competing arguments are that tax competi-
tion leads to governments being more efficient, thus harmonization and consolida-
tion of tax systems are not necessarily desirable. On the other hand, governments 
aiming at harmonization have to worry about an eroding tax base due to the infa-
mous “race to the bottom”. Two directives (from 1977 and 2006) concerning indi-
rect taxation address the minimum VAT levy, currently 15%. Another directive 
2 UCLG – United Cities and Local Governments (2010) provide a detailed overview of fiscal decentraliza-
tion in different world regions. 
3 Note that due to limitations related to data availability this study concentrates on the rate factors of the vari-
ous tax systems. These datasets can be compiled for over 40 years while for non-rate factors we can only find 
a cross-section for the years 2006-2008. Hopefully, future research can expand the analysis using time-series 
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442 from 2003 deals with taxes on interest and royalties. Similarly, the creation of a 
common consolidated corporate income tax base (CCCBT) which should prevent 
companies from “tax haven shopping” by moving to the jurisdiction that offers the 
most tax incentives has been discussed at various occasions (Quéré, Trannoy and 
Wolff, 2014). We believe that in light of these discussions an analysis of the cur-
rent status of tax harmonization within the EU and within the eurozone should be 
of interest to academics and policy makers. Therefore, in addition to the descrip-
tive analysis comparing different dimensions of tax systems within and outside 
the EU (eurozone) and over time, this study also makes an attempt to explore what 
factors – other than EU and eurozone membership – affect tax system similarities/
differences and fiscal coordination.
3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We gather the information for each country’s tax system from the OECD database 
for all countries in the OECD and for the years 1965 through 2012. For the first 
part of the study we use descriptive statistics to analyze and compare the follow-
ing tax system dimensions across the different countries and across time: 
1) The country’s total tax burden measured as the country’s total tax revenue 
as a percentage of its gross domestic product (years 1965-2012).
2) The country’s income tax reliance measured as the country’s share of rev-
enue collected from income taxes (at any level of government) as a per-
centage of its total tax revenues (years 1965-2012).
3) The country’s fiscal decentralization measured as the country’s share of 
revenue collected at the local and state level as a percentage of its total tax 
revenues (years 1973-2012).
Average values for each tax rate variable, year, and dataset (all countries, EU 
member countries, and eurozone countries) are presented in tables 1 through 3. 
The summary statistics suggest, and simple t-tests (not tabulated), confirm that EU 
member countries and countries in the eurozone have a higher tax burden, lower 
income tax reliance, and – depending on the year – marginally higher or lower 
fiscal decentralization than other countries.4
Table 1
Average tax burden, income tax reliance, and fiscal decentralization for all countries 
(years 1965-2012), in %







4 It is interesting to note that in the later years (starting in the 1990s) the EU and euro-zone countries appear 
to have more centralized tax collections which is due to the “new countries” (mostly former East bloc coun-
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443Year Tax burden Income tax reliance Fiscal decentralization
1971 28.00 36.76
1972 27.68 36.82
1973 27.82 37.41 28.91
1974 28.68 39.15 28.62
1975 29.35 37.11 33.00
1976 30.31 38.14 28.95
1977 31.03 38.25 29.39
1978 30.92 38.62 29.09
1979 30.84 38.98 28.71
1980 30.92 38.18 24.93
1981 31.62 38.12 24.53
1982 32.03 37.75 25.17
1983 32.19 37.75 25.62
1984 32.38 36.80 25.11
1985 32.51 36.89 26.11
1986 33.15 36.81 25.69
1987 33.62 36.29 25.60
1988 33.61 37.00 25.51
1989 33.45 37.43 23.40
1990 33.10 37.10 23.90
1991 33.57 35.84 24.08
1992 33.78 35.42 24.25
1993 34.27 35.01 24.61
1994 34.23 34.89 24.31
1995 34.58 33.98 22.44
1996 34.96 33.71 22.27
1997 34.94 34.17 22.26
1998 34.93 34.69 22.26
1999 35.21 34.24 22.58
2000 35.30 35.00 21.59
2001 34.84 34.63 21.87
2002 34.55 33.83 23.62
2003 34.48 33.46 23.90
2004 34.43 33.60 24.14
2005 35.02 34.35 24.14
2006 35.14 35.26 24.35
2007 35.20 35.93 24.49
2008 34.62 35.32 24.64
2009 33.78 33.48 25.31
2010 33.76 33.11 24.55
2011 34.12 33.52 24.97
2012 35.44 33.98 30.16
Notes: Countries in the sample – Australia (excluding year 2012), Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Chile (starting 1990), Czech Republic (starting 1993), Denmark, Estonia (starting 1995), 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary (starting 1991), Iceland (starting 1980), Ireland, 
Israel (starting 1995), Italy, Japan, Korea (starting 1972), Luxembourg, Mexico (starting 1980), 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland (starting 1991), Portugal, Slovak Republic (start-
ing 1995), Slovenia (starting 1995), Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and 
United States. Tax burden is measured as total tax revenues as percentage of GDP; income tax 
reliance is measured as total revenues from income taxes as percentage of total tax revenues; 
fiscal decentralization is measured as total revenues collected at the local (municipal or county) 
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444 Table 2
Average tax burden, income tax reliance, and fiscal decentralization for EU countries 
(years 1965-2009), in %









1973 32.74 34.64 32.27
1974 33.70 36.81 32.65
1975 34.47 35.88 31.29
1976 35.36 35.94 31.16
1977 36.09 36.56 31.84
1978 36.10 37.05 31.86
1979 36.01 36.74 31.70
1980 37.23 36.65 31.71
1981 36.01 34.90 30.69
1982 37.12 34.52 30.61
1983 37.98 34.04 30.55
1984 38.02 34.26 30.56
1985 38.20 34.60 30.81
1986 36.72 32.41 20.83
1987 37.12 32.63 20.56
1988 36.91 33.05 20.98
1989 36.28 33.55 15.81
1990 36.31 33.83 16.19
1991 36.51 33.91 15.72
1992 37.05 33.39 15.74
1993 37.50 33.51 16.14
1994 37.55 33.05 16.12
1995 38.83 33.52 13.72
1996 39.83 33.54 13.91
1997 39.85 34.11 14.41
1998 39.90 34.47 14.73
1999 40.29 34.44 14.82
2000 40.35 35.16 14.54
2001 39.66 34.80 14.28
2002 39.14 34.05 17.35
2003 38.93 33.33 17.88
2004 37.64 30.04 18.39
2005 38.07 30.27 18.58
2006 38.05 30.80 19.02
2007 38.17 31.42 19.13
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445Year Tax burden Income tax reliance Fiscal decentralization
2009 37.35 29.78 19.43
2010 37.19 29.18 17.97
2011 37.37 29.26 19.31
2012 38.17 30.20 21.60
Notes: Countries in the EU are Austria (joined 1995), Belgium, Czech Republic (joined 2004), 
Denmark (joined 1973), Estonia (joined 2004), Finland (joined 1995), France, Germany, Greece 
(joined 1981), Hungary (joined 2004), Ireland (joined 1973), Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Poland (joined 2004), Portugal (joined 1986), Slovenia (joined 2004), Slovak Republic (joined 
2004), Spain (joined 1986), Sweden (joined 1995), and United Kingdom (joined 1973). Tax burden 
is measured as total tax revenues as percentage of GDP; income tax reliance is measured as total 
revenues from income taxes as percentage of total tax revenues; fiscal decentralization is meas-
ured as total revenues collected at the local (municipal or county) and state level as percentage 
of total tax revenues (data only available after 1972).
Table 3
Average tax burden, income tax reliance, and fiscal decentralization for eurozone 
countries (years 1999-2012), in %
Year Tax burden Income tax reliance Fiscal decentralization
1999 39.51 32.07 14.82
2000 39.47 32.72 14.54
2001 38.41 32.09 14.28
2002 38.10 31.44 17.35
2003 37.82 30.53 17.88
2004 37.59 30.33 18.39
2005 37.96 30.60 18.58
2006 38.17 31.05 19.02
2007 38.16 31.14 19.13
2008 37.77 30.96 19.33
2009 36.63 28.71 19.43
2010 36.84 28.40 17.97
2011 37.19 28.90 19.31
2012 37.76 29.47 21.60
Notes: Countries in the eurozone are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece (joined 
2001), Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia (joined 2007), Slovak Republic 
(joined 2009), and Spain. Tax burden is measured as total tax revenues as percentage of GDP; 
income tax reliance is measured as total revenues from income taxes as percentage of total tax 
revenues; and fiscal decentralization is measured as total revenues collected at the local (munic-
ipal or county) or state level as percentage of total tax revenues.
Of the three tax system variables, burden and income tax reliance are positively 
correlated for all OECD countries, and the sub-samples of all EU member coun-
tries and all eurozone countries. Tax burden and fiscal decentralization are not sig-
nificantly correlated for all OECD countries, but negatively correlated for the sub-
samples of EU countries as well as the sub-sample of eurozone countries. Income 
tax reliance and fiscal decentralization are positively related for all OECD coun-
tries, not significantly correlated in the case of the EU countries, but negatively 
correlated for the eurozone countries. On a yearly basis, the correlations coeffi-





































































40 (4) 437-461 (2016)
446 The tax administration and enforcement measures were compiled from three OECD 
studies (Robinson and Slemrod, 2011; OECD, 2006; 2007; 2008) and not available 
across time. The Robinson and Slemrod (2011) measures are presented in table 4.
Table 4











































































































































































































































































Australia 1 1 1 3 5 10 8 0.9 1.55 1 -0.664
Austria 0 3 2 2 2 10 8 2 1.44 0 -0.886
Belgium 0 5 1 4 4 9 6 2 2.54 0 -0.992
Canada 1 2 1 8 6 9 8 0.5 1.69 1 -0.100
Chile 1 4 2 8 4 5 8 3 0.36
Czech R. 0 3 2 1 6 9 9 0.2 2.17 1 -0.774
Denmark 0 5 2 7 5 13 6 2 2.47 1 0.635
Estonia 1 3 2 4 5 10 5 2.23
Finland 0 5 1 5 6 9 6 0.3 1.7 1 -0.415
France 0 0 0 9 1 9 6 0.8 3.12 1 -1.108
Germany 0 4 2 3 2 12 7 2.04 1
Greece 0 9 1 9 3 12 9 2 1.94 1 0.761
Hungary 1 6 1 5 6 12 8 0.5 1.96 1 0.277
Iceland 0 5 1 7 5 8 8 0.25 0.5 1 -0.216
Ireland 1 5 2 6 4 9 8 1 2.43 1 0.246
Israel
Italy 1 5 2 7 6 10 7 2 0.85 1 0.754
Japan 1 7 2 9 0 6 6 0.4 0.67 1 0.504
Korea 1 7 2 8 6 12 5 0.4 0.49 1 1.274
Luxembourg 0 4 2 2 5 9 3 0.4 2.91 0 -1.016
Mexico 1 9 2 10 5 12 5 0.75 0.49 1 1.701
Netherlands 0 5 2 4 5 9 7 2 2.81 1 -0.215
New Zealand 1 3 2 3 5 9 8 1.5 2.2 1 -0.231
Norway 0 1 1 5 6 11 5 0.6 2.01 1 -0.607
Poland 1 6 2 6 5 10 9 1.86 1
Portugal 0 7 1 8 5 10 7 1.64 1
Slovak R. 1 4 2 4 1 8 4 0.15 1.5 1 -0.213
Slovenia 0 7 1 7 4 9 7 1.8
Spain 1 8 2 10 6 10 6 1.5 0.99 1 1.379
Sweden 0 3 1 6 5 11 4 0.2 1.68 1 -0.294
Switzerland 0 3 0 1 0 9 6 0.18 0
Turkey 1 6 2 7 4 13 7 1 0.91 1 1.088
UK 1 9 2 8 4 8 6 1 2.21 1 0.807
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447Figure 1
Tax burden, income tax reliance, and fiscal decentralization for EU and non-EU 














































Income tax reliance (%)
Notes: EU member countries are red; non-EU member countries are gray; overall mean (black), 
EU member country mean (red); and non-EU member country mean (gray) is presented as small 
circle. Size of the bubble represents tax burden (tax revenues as percentage of GDP); x-axis meas-
ures income tax reliance (tax revenues from income taxes as percentage of total revenues); y-axis 
measure fiscal decentralization (tax revenues collected at non-federal, i.e., local and state levels 
as percentage of total tax revenues). 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate which countries are similar and different with regard to 
the three tax-rate factors for the years 1975 and 2010.5 According to these graphs, 
EU countries do tend to cluster together – with Denmark and Germany being 
outliers or exceptions. 
Of course, in addition to EU and eurozone membership, other factors also impact 
tax burden, tax composition, and fiscal decentralization. For example, prior re-
search has shown that tax systems are significantly different in common law than 
in code law countries (Pippin et al., 2010). Similarly, Kenny and Winer (2006) 
suggest that the countries’ tax systems are affected by different political regimes, 
such as capitalist versus socialist or democratic versus non-democratic. We there-
fore expect that countries that were members of the former Eastern bloc will 
5 Note that in 1975 the entire sample consisted of fewer non-EU and EU member countries. In the 1990s several 
countries joined the OECD increasing the total number of countries from 24 in 1965 to 34 in 1995. Some (but 
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448 Figure 2
Tax burden, income tax reliance, and fiscal decentralization for EU, eurozone, 






















































5 15 25 35 45 55 65 75
Income tax reliance (%)
Notes: EU member countries are red; eurozone countries are dark red; non-EU member countries 
are gray; overall mean (black), EU member country mean (red); and non-EU member country 
mean (gray) is presented as small circle. Size of the bubble represents tax burden (tax revenues 
as percentage of GDP); x-axis measures income tax reliance (tax revenues from income taxes as 
percentage of total revenues); y-axis measure fiscal decentralization (tax revenues collected at 
non-federal, i.e., local and state levels as percentage of total tax revenues). 
exhibit significant differences due their history during the Cold War as well as the 
economic challenges these new democracies were faced with in the 1990s and are 
still facing today. In order to control for these effects, we test the tax system dif-
ferences using simple OLS regression models:
 VAR
it
 = β0 + β1 EUit + β2 EUROit + β3 ANGLOi + β4 EASTi  








 + β7 YOUNGit + β8 OLDit + τt + εit 
(1)
The dependent variable, VAR
i, t
, is one of the three tax collection metrics, total tax 
revenues as percentage of GDP, income tax revenues as percentage of total tax 
revenues, or state and local tax revenues as percentage of total tax revenues, for 
each country i and year t in the sample. EU, EURO, ANGLO, and EAST are dummy 
variables equaling one for EU or eurozone membership, common law country, or 
former Eastern bloc countries respectively and zero otherwise. We control for de-
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449a scale variable. For example, countries that have large populations tend to have 
more decentralized fiscal systems. Thus, we include POP, which is the natural log 
of the country’s population. A country’s gross domestic product per capita controls 
for the development level of the country. While European countries are relatively 
higher-income, there is still some variation, especially between East and West. In 
our model GDP measures GDP per capita (also logged). Further, we include 
YOUNG (OLD), which measures the percentage of the population under 15 (over 
64). These demographic variables are used to control for the potential impact of 
demography, particularly the working age population and elderly population, on 
tax burden, tax composition and the level of decentralized public service delivery. 
Last, we include indicator variables, one for each year of data used in the sample 
(τ
t
) to control for time effects. ε
it
 is the error term and is i.i.d.
As stated above, visual analysis and t-test results suggest significant differences 
between EU and non-EU members. However, a visual comparison of 1975 with 
2010 does not imply that the tax systems of the EU countries have converged over 
time. In order to test whether tax systems have become more similar (or different) 
in each of the three tax rate dimensions (burden, income tax reliance, and decen-












 is the mean value for the respective variable for all countries, for EU 
member countries only, and for eurozone countries only for each year t in the 
sample. That is, for each of the three tax collection variables, “tax burden”, “in-
come tax reliance”, and “fiscal decentralization”, we compute three different aver-
ages: “overall mean”, “mean of EU member countries”, and “mean of eurozone 
countries.” Then, for each metric (tax burden, income tax reliance, fiscal decen-
tralization), for each country, and for each year in the sample, we compare the 
individual country value to the overall mean, the EU mean, and the eurozone 
mean for the respective year. The difference is scaled by the respective mean and 
taken as an absolute term. Summary statistics of the difference to means measures 
for all countries as well as the subgroups “EU members only” and “eurozone 
only” are presented in table 5.
A comparison of the measures in Panel A (all countries) with Panel B (EU mem -
ber countries) and Panel C (eurozone countries) suggests that, on average, the 
differences to the mean for the tax burden and income tax reliance variables tend 
to be smaller when only considering EU member (eurozone) countries. However, 
in the case of fiscal decentralization, EU member (eurozone) countries are more 
different from the mean than the entire country group. This is true for all countries 
as well as the subgroup summary statistics, thus providing some support for the 
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450 Table 5
Summary statistics for differences to mean variables
Panel A. All countries
Scaled absolute difference of… Mean Min. Max. Std. dev.
…tax burden to 
overall mean 0.201 0.000 0.670 0.145
mean of EU member countries 0.197 0.001 0.719 0.146
mean of eurozone countries 0.177 0.000 0.599 0.128
… income tax  
reliance to
overall mean 0.267 0.000 0.990 0.188
mean of EU member countries 0.298 0.000 1.480 0.232
mean of eurozone countries 0.294 0.000 1.154 0.250
… fiscal 
decentralization to 
overall mean 0.428 0.002 0.979 0.307
mean of EU member countries 0.436 0.002 0.979 0.305
mean of eurozone countries 0.494 0.028 0.933 0.313
Panel B. EU member countries
Scaled absolute difference of… Mean Min. Max. Std. dev.
…tax burden to 
overall mean 0.180 0.001 0.476 0.125
mean of EU member countries 0.134 0.001 0.391 0.084
mean of eurozone countries 0.130 0.000 0.339 0.081
… income tax  
reliance to
overall mean 0.229 0.000 0.814 0.191
mean of EU member countries 0.246 0.002 1.010 0.204
mean of eurozone countries 0.232 0.001 1.154 0.206
… fiscal 
decentralization to 
overall mean 0.515 0.044 0.882 0.288
mean of EU member countries 0.532 0.033 0.890 0.282
mean of eurozone countries 0.590 0.099 0.898 0.264
Panel C. Eurozone countries
Scaled absolute difference of… Mean Min. Max. Std. dev.
…tax burden to 
overall mean 0.157 0.001 0.343 0.093
mean of EU member countries 0.120 0.001 0.292 0.071
mean of eurozone countries 0.121 0.000 0.272 0.070
… income tax 
reliance to
overall mean 0.180 0.000 0.477 0.123
mean of EU member countries 0.169 0.002 0.476 0.108
mean of eurozone countries 0.161 0.001 0.453 0.102
… fiscal 
decentralization to 
overall mean 0.535 0.044 0.882 0.299
mean of EU member countries 0.569 0.033 0.890 0.279
mean of eurozone countries 0.590 0.099 0.898 0.264
Notes: Tax burden is measured as total tax revenues as percentage of GDP; income tax reliance 
is measured as revenues from income taxes as percentage of total tax revenues; and fiscal decen-
tralization is measured as revenues collected at state or local government levels as percentage 
of total tax revenues. For each year in the sample, each country’s value is compared to the mean 
value for the respective year. The difference is scaled by the mean and taken as an absolute term.
If countries’ tax systems become more similar over time, the difference to the 
mean will decline over time. Nontabulated summary statistics of the difference to 
mean metrics for each country and each year individually suggest no significant 
difference across time with the exception of the year 1995 when several countries 





































































40 (4) 437-461 (2016)
451employ regression analysis with a time benchmark dummy and interaction varia-
bles. First, we test how the country-specific, demographic, and economic factors 
affect the difference to the mean for each tax system variable:
DIFF_MEAN
it
 = β0 + β1 EUit + β2 EUROit + β3 ANGLOi + β4 EASTi  








 + β7 YOUNGit + β8 OLDit + τt + εit 
(3)
Next, we use simple t-tests to determine whether the difference to mean metrics 
are significantly different before and after certain time “benchmark” events, 
namely the period before/after 1992 and the period before/after 2004. One impor-
tant event for EU countries was the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. 
Among other things it led to the creation of the common currency (euro) and 
established the three pillars of the European Union, “European Community”, 
“Common Foreign and Security Policy”, and “Justice and Home Affairs.” It also 
included a clause mandating all member countries to keep “sound fiscal policies” 
with countries’ debt limited to 60% of GDP and annual deficits no greater than 3% 
of GDP. While we cannot assume that the European Union’s requirement of 
“sound fiscal policy” directly changed member countries’ tax systems, we believe 
that over time it could have led to a more harmonized system of collecting reve-
nues. Thus, we separate the sample into the time period before and including the 
year of 1992 and the time period after 1992. 
The single largest expansion of the European Union, in terms of territory, number 
of countries, and population took place in 2004 with Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia join-
ing the community. These new member countries brought many challenges – 
some due to the fact that they were part of the former Eastern bloc. Member states 
anticipated and dealt with significant difficulties. Nonetheless, according to the 
European Commission the enlargement was a success (Vucheva, 2009). The new 
dynamic in the European Parliament and among member countries undoubtedly 
impacted each members’ fiscal strategy. We therefore also compare the years be-
fore and after 2004. 
DIFF_MEAN
it
 = β0 + β1 EUit + β2 EUROit + β3 ANGLOi + β4 EASTi + β5 POPit 




 + β7 YOUNGit + β8 OLDit + β9 PERIOD1992  
             + β10 PERIOD2004 + β11 EU * PERIOD1992  
             + β
12 
EU * PERIOD2004 + β
13 




PERIOD1992 (PERIOD2004) is an indicator variable for the time period before 
1992 (2004) equaling 1 for the years after 1992 (2004) and zero otherwise. Note that 
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452 4 RESULTS
The regression results are presented in tables 6, 7, and 9. Table 8 shows the t-tests 
examining whether the difference to the mean variables is significantly distinct 
before or after 1992 and before and after 2004. The results for the tax system de-
pendent variables (table 6, Panel A) confirm a significant difference of tax system 
variables for EU member countries as well as eurozone countries. Specifically, the 
tax burden is higher but income tax reliance and fiscal decentralization are lower 
for EU member countries. For eurozone countries, the signs are opposite for tax 
burden and fiscal decentralization – but not for income tax reliance (after control-
ling for EU membership). Common law countries, such as the UK and Australia, 
have higher income tax reliance and lower fiscal decentralization. For the coun-
tries from the former Eastern bloc it is the opposite. The size of the country (meas-
ured by the natural log of the population) and the percentage of younger people 
(under 15) are negatively related to tax burden but economic output per capita as 
well as the older (over 64) population are positively correlated. 
For the non-rate tax system variables – the measures related to administration and 
enforcement (Robinson and Slemrod, 2011) – simple OLS regression analysis, 
shown in table 6 below, does not imply a significant difference between EU mem-
ber (eurozone) countries and others. More important seems to be whether a coun-
try has a common law system or is a former Eastern bloc country. For example, 
according to the regression results, common law countries are more likely to em-
ploy a tax system of self-assessment & self-reporting of certain taxes, and allow 
tax officials more access to taxpayer information than non-Anglo countries. For-
mer Eastern bloc countries, on the other hand, have lower dispersed responsibility 
and lower penalty rates. Also significant is GDP per capita which is negatively 
correlated with most non-rate tax system measures implying that richer countries 
have fewer administrative and enforcement tools – such as withholding of differ-
ent types of taxes, penalties for non-compliance, or access to bank information – 
than countries with a lower average of GDP per capita. Although regression re-
sults do not suggest a relationship, Pearson correlation coefficients (nontabulated) 
are significant for the correlation between the EU (eurozone) dummy variable and 
the self-assessment indicator (negative) as well as the “coverage of enforcement” 
measure (positive). This implies that EU and eurozone countries might be less 
likely to allow taxpayers to self-assess their tax due and have more enforcement 
possibilities. It is important to note that due to a very limited sample size for non-
rate tax system metrics (a set of 34 countries and no time-series information) any 
failure to find significant results could also be a problem of statistical power.
The results for regression model (3) are listed in table 7. The dependent variable in 
each model is the scaled absolute difference of the tax system variable to the respec-
tive group means (overall mean, EU country mean, and eurozone country mean). 
The regression results suggest that EU membership and eurozone membership are 
generally significantly related to the difference to mean numbers even after con-
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453as demographic and economic variables. Note that this applies to all three differ-
ence-to-mean metrics: difference to mean of all countries, difference to mean of 
EU countries only, and difference to mean of eurozone countries only. For example, 
we find that EU members’ tax burdens are more similar to the mean tax burden of 
all countries but also more similar to the mean tax burden of EU countries and the 
mean tax burden of eurozone countries. 
The impact of time effects was introduced with the two benchmark years, 1992 
and 2004, to test if tax system harmonization occurred overall, within EU coun-
tries, and/or within eurozone countries after the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and/or 
the biggest EU expansion in 2004. We used t-tests as well as regression model (4) 
to evaluate the difference to means before/after 1992 and before/after 2004. Table 
8 (Panel A) illustrates that tax systems seem to converge with regard to the tax 
burden variable but that there is much less harmonization for income tax reliance 
and no convergence for fiscal decentralization. More specifically, the tax burdens 
converge for all countries as well as for the EU countries. Income tax reliance 
converges for all countries but not for the sub-sample of EU countries, and coun-
tries’ fiscal decentralization does not become more similar over time. Note that for 
the subsample of eurozone countries there are no data before 1999. 
Table 6











   7.482*** -0.036*** -0.138***
(0.434) (0.008) (0.020)
Eurozone membership
-3.217*** -0.065***    0.108***
(0.670) (0.011) (0.026)
Common law (Anglo) country
-0.323    0.067*** -0.136***
(0.505) (0.008) (0.019)
Former East bloc country
   2.914***    0.038*** -0.066**
(0.651) (0.011) (0.029)
Population (natural log)
-0.900*** -0.005**    0.042***
(0.147) (0.002) (0.005)
GDP per capita (natural log)
  10.807***    0.175***    0.302***
(0.544) (0.010) (0.039)
Percentage of population under 15
-0.147**    0.428*** -2.799***
(0.069) (0.124) (0.294)
Percentage of population over 64
   0.366*** 0.020 -4.306***
(0.109) (0.185) (0.604)
Adjusted R-square 0.511 0.359 0.641
Overall F 22.750 12.870 13.27
Notes: Tax burden is measured as total tax revenues as percentage of GDP; income tax reliance 
is measured as revenues from income taxes as percentage of total tax revenues; and fiscal decen-
tralization is measured as revenues collected at state and local government levels as percent-
age of total tax revenues. All regression models include year dummies (not tabulated). Standard 
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457The results from the t-tests further suggest that the 2004 expansion did not impact 
tax system harmonization much. The tax burden variable (tax revenues in percent 
of GDP) converges for all countries in the sample and for the EU member coun-
tries. There appears to be no harmonization with regard to fiscal decentralization. 
Table 8
Difference to mean measures 
Panel A. Before and after 1992 (Maastricht Treaty)
All countries EU countries
Absolute difference of tax 
burden to tax burden mean
before 1992 0.230 0.206
after 1992 0.182 0.167
P-value  <.0001 0.001
Absolute difference of 
income tax reliance to 
income tax reliance mean
before 1992 0.278 0.226
after 1992 0.257 0.227
P-value 0.073 0.936
Absolute difference of fiscal 
decentralization to fiscal 
decentralization mean
before 1992 0.460 0.331
after 1992 0.540 0.483
P-value 0.013 0.003







Absolute difference of tax 
burden to tax burden mean
before 2004 0.210 0.194 0.162
after 2004 0.175 0.151 0.153
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.538
Absolute difference of 
income tax reliance to 
income tax reliance mean
before 2004 0.266 0.221 0.186
after 2004 0.265 0.239 0.176
P-value 0.970 0.306 0.595
Absolute difference of fiscal 
decentralization to fiscal 
decentralization mean
before 2004 0.503 0.428 0.482
after 2004 0.495 0.468 0.468
P-value 0.850 0.447 0.841
Notes: Tax burden is measured as total tax revenues as percentage of GDP; income tax reliance 
is measured as revenues from income taxes as percentage of total tax revenues; and fiscal decen-
tralization is measured as revenues collected at state and local government levels as percentage 
of total tax revenues. Fiscal decentralization data is not available for years 1972 and earlier. 
Euro-countries cannot be assessed for the time period before 1992.
The t-tests only examined whether some harmonization is taking place but not 
whether there is more cooperation within the EU (eurozone) than among other 
OECD countries in our sample. This is tested in regression model 4 with the re-
sults presented in table 9. The results confirm that the difference of country tax 
variable to the mean tax variable is lower for EU countries in the case of the tax 
burden and income tax reliance but not in the case of fiscal decentralization. The 
significantly negative correlation of the “later than 1992” dummy variable with 
the tax burden and with income tax reliance indicates that after the year 1992, on 
average, the difference between the country variable and the overall mean was 
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458 tralization. After the year 2004, the absolute difference to the mean increased 
again for the burden and income tax reliance measures but decreased for fiscal 
decentralization. The coefficient estimates for interactions between the 1992 year 
and 2004 year and the EU dummy variables provide a mixed image of tax harmo-
nization. For the tax burden measure and for the income tax reliance variable, the 
interaction of EU country and later than 1992 (later than 2004) time measure is 
positive (negative) which would indicate that at first, the difference to the mean 
decreases less for EU countries than for the entire country set as a whole but then, 
after 2004, this trend reverses. For the fiscal decentralization measure, the results 
are mostly not significant suggesting that tax system cooperation within the EU or 
eurozone is not significantly different (stronger or weaker). 
Table 9
Tests for tax harmonization within EU and eurozone (OLS regression results)
Dependent variable is the absolute difference of the countries...
...tax burden to overall 
tax burden mean
...income tax reliance 
to overall income tax 
reliance mean
...fiscal decentralization 














Intercept -0.585 0.133*** 1.367 0.198*** 0.375 0.634
EU membership -0.038 0.012*** -0.078 0.018*** 0.118 0.056**
Eurozone 
membership
-0.009 0.018 -0.050 0.027* 0.013 0.070
Common law 
(Anglo) country
-0.132 0.009*** 0.040 0.014*** -0.119 0.037***
Former East bloc 
country
-0.100 0.013*** 0.104 0.020*** -0.197 0.073***
Population  
(natural log)
0.025 0.003*** -0.014 0.004*** -0.093 0.013***
GDP per capita  
(natural log)
0.005 0.010 -0.058 0.015*** 0.249 0.049***
Percentage of 
population under 25
1.387 0.154*** -0.689 0.228*** 0.866 0.777
Percentage of 
population over 64
0.661 0.224*** -1.088 0.332*** -6.922 1.337***
Later than 1992 -0.024 0.013* -0.034 0.019* 0.043 0.049
Later than 2004 0.030 0.016* 0.065 0.024** -0.095 0.055*
Interaction of 1992 
with EU 
0.049 0.018*** 0.076 0.027*** 0.010 0.076
Interaction of 2004 
with EU 
-0.046 0.025*** 0.042 0.037  
Interaction of 2004 
with eurozone 
0.016 0.027 -0.103 0.039*** 0.122 0.082
Adjusted R-square  0.31  0.13  0.38
Overall F 38.83 13.74 17.29
Notes: Tax burden is measured as total tax revenues as percentage of GDP; income tax reliance 
is measured as revenues from income taxes as percentage of total tax revenues; and fiscal decen-
tralization is measured as revenues collected at state and local government levels as percentage 
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459Nontabulated results using dependent variables with the absolute difference to the 
EU mean and the absolute difference to the eurozone mean also imply not much 
difference in cooperation within the EU (eurozone) than otherwise.
5 CONCLUSION
Tax systems can be assessed using a plethora of rate and non-rate variables. This 
study focuses on three rate variables measuring different aspects of tax collection as 
well as several non-rate measures related to administration and enforcement. The 
descriptive analysis, graphical representation, as well as t-tests indicate that tax sys-
tems within the EU and within the eurozone (even when controlling for EU member-
ship) are significantly different from other countries’ tax systems with regard to tax 
burden, income tax reliance, and fiscal decentralization. As one might expect, the tax 
burden in EU countries is significantly higher than in other OECD countries. Interest-
ingly, countries in the eurozone have, on average, lower tax burdens than other EU 
countries that have not adopted the euro. Income tax reliance, which has sometimes 
been used as proxy of a tax system’s general rate structure and progressivity (Robin-
son and Slemrod, 2011; Richardson, 2007), is lower in EU countries and even lower 
in eurozone countries. Similarly, there is less fiscal decentralization in the EU; again, 
the difference is not quite as high for countries in the eurozone as in countries that 
have joined the EU but have not adopted the euro. With regard to non-rate dimen-
sions of tax systems, i.e., metrics related to tax administration and enforcement, the 
differences between EU countries and non-EU countries are not significant. 
When analyzing the change of the tax system variables over time, one might expect 
some coordination of certain tax variables – especially within country groups that 
have a common currency system. Indeed, t-test results confirm overall tax system 
harmonization with regard to tax burden by comparing the difference to the means 
for each tax system variable using the benchmark years of 1992 (Maastricht Treaty) 
and 2004 (largest expansion of the European Union). For other variables not much 
cooperation can be detected. Moreover, tax system harmonization does not appear to 
be different (stronger or weaker) for EU member (eurozone) countries. This is note-
worthy especially in the current political climate where many politicians are asking 
for more tax cooperation among EU (eurozone) member countries. The next task 
might therefore be to identify possible reasons for the lack of cooperation. One an-
swer may lay in the analysis of non-rate factors related to administration and enforce-
ment (Robinson and Slemrod, 2011). These variables measure how countries admin-
ister and enforce tax collection, with higher numbers generally implying more/better 
means to combat non-compliance or tax evasion. Unfortunately, for the non-rate tax 
system dimensions no time-series analysis is possible at this point. Of course, it 
would be interesting to compare and correlate changes in tax administration and en-
forcement with changes of other tax system variables. Future research may investi-
gate whether a country’s tax structure changes together with the administration of tax 
reporting and collection. Furthermore, a tax system index that combines non-rate and 
rate information might help with future analysis and comparisons. We therefore hope 
that this research will be extended to develop a more comprehensive tax system index 
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